| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w21878
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 21878
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| International Coordination |
| Jeffrey A. Frankel
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| 发表日期 | 2016-01-18
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| 出版年 | 2016
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | After a 30-year absence, calls for international coordination of macroeconomic policy are back. This time the issues go by names like currency wars, taper tantrums, and fiscal compacts. In traditional game theory terms, the existence of spillovers implies that countries are potentially better off if they coordinate policies than under the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. But what is the nature of the spillover and the coordination? The paper interprets recent macroeconomic history in terms of four possible frameworks for proposals to coordinate fiscal policy or monetary policy: the locomotive game, the discipline game, the competitive depreciation game and the competitive appreciation game. (The paper also considers claims that monetary coordination has been made necessary by the zero lower bound among advanced countries or financial imperfections among emerging markets.) Perceptions of the sign of spillovers and the direction of proposed coordination vary widely. The existence of different models and different domestic interests may be as important as the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. In some cases complaints about foreigners’ actions and calls for cooperation may obscure the need to settle domestic disagreements. |
| 主题 | International Economics
; International Macroeconomics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21878
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579553
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jeffrey A. Frankel. International Coordination. 2016.
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文件名：
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w21878.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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