| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21911 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21911 |
| How Collateral Laws Shape Lending and Sectoral Activity | |
| Charles W. Calomiris; Mauricio Larrain; José M. Liberti; Jason D. Sturgess | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We demonstrate the central importance of creditors’ ability to use “movable” assets as collateral (as distinct from “immovable” real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro-level loan dataset containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that loan-to-values of loans collateralized with movable assets are lower in countries with weak collateral laws, relative to immovable assets, and that lending is biased towards the use of immovable assets. Using sector-level data, we find that weak movable collateral laws create distortions in the allocation of resources that favor immovable-based production. An analysis of Slovakia’s collateral law reform confirms our findings. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21911 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579586 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles W. Calomiris,Mauricio Larrain,José M. Liberti,et al. How Collateral Laws Shape Lending and Sectoral Activity. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21911.pdf（589KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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