| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21934 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21934 |
| Starting Small: Endogenous Stakes and Rational Cooperation | |
| James Andreoni; Michael A. Kuhn; Larry Samuelson | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We report experimental results for a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are principled to “do the right thing,” or cooperate, as long as their opponent is sufficiently likely to do so. The presence of such types can be exploited to enhance cooperation by structuring the twice-played prisoners’ dilemma to “start small,” so that the second-stage stakes are larger (but not too much larger) than the first-stage stakes. We compare conditions where the allocation of stakes is chosen exogenously to conditions where it is chosen by the players themselves. We show that players are able to find and choose the payoff maximizing strategy of starting small in a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma, and that the salutary payoff effects of doing so are larger than those that arise when the same allocation is exogenously chosen. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Culture |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21934 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579608 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James Andreoni,Michael A. Kuhn,Larry Samuelson. Starting Small: Endogenous Stakes and Rational Cooperation. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21934.pdf（322KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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