| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21943 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21943 |
| Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory | |
| Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Frédéric Malherbe | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21943 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579617 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton,Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Frédéric Malherbe. Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21943.pdf（279KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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