| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21948 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21948 |
| Political Economy of Sovereign Debt: A Theory of Cycles of Populism and Austerity | |
| Alessandro Dovis; Mikhail Golosov; Ali Shourideh | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study optimal fiscal and redistributive policies in an open economy without commitment. Due to its redistributive motives, the government’s incentive to default on its external debt is affected by inequality. We show that in equilibrium the economy endogenously fluctuates between two regimes. In the first regime, the government borrows from abroad, spends generously on transfers and keeps the inequality low. In the second regime, it implements austerity-like policies by cutting transfers, reducing foreign debt and increasing the inequality. The equilibrium dynamics resembles the populist cycles documented in many developing countries. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21948 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579622 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Dovis,Mikhail Golosov,Ali Shourideh. Political Economy of Sovereign Debt: A Theory of Cycles of Populism and Austerity. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21948.pdf（557KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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