| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21953 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21953 |
| Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game | |
| Anthony Heyes; John A. List | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There is a large and diverse body of evidence that people condition their behavior on the characteristics of others. If type is visible then one agent seeing another with whom they are interacting, or observing some other close proxy for type, can affect outcomes. We explore the economics of revealing type in a simple laboratory experiment to learn about the underlying motivations for discrimination. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Discrimination |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21953 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579627 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anthony Heyes,John A. List. Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21953.pdf（57KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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