| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21963 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21963 |
| The Limits of Meritocracy: Screening Bureaucrats Under Imperfect Verifiability | |
| Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato; Xiao Yu Wang; Shuang Zhang | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Does bureaucratic ability predict promotion in governments? We show that self-reported performance in enforcing the One Child Policy predicts mayoral promotion in China. However, misreporting handicaps screening—a non-manipulated performance measure does not predict promotion. We show that this is consistent with a model where a government has a meritocratic objective but underestimates the imperfect verifiability of performance, rather than a model where a government is only interested in the illusion of meritocracy. Thus, despite meritocratic intentions, we challenge the notion that a successful promotion system effectively substituted for democratic institutions in explaining Chinese growth. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Country Studies ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21963 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579636 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato,Xiao Yu Wang,Shuang Zhang. The Limits of Meritocracy: Screening Bureaucrats Under Imperfect Verifiability. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21963.pdf（1298KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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