全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Dynamic Savings Choices with Disagreements

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w22007
来源ID	Working Paper 22007
	Dynamic Savings Choices with Disagreements
	Dan Cao; Iván Werning
发表日期	2016-02-22
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	We study a flexible dynamic savings game in continuous time, where decision makers rotate in and out of power. These agents value spending more highly while in power creating a time-inconsistency problem. We provide a sharp characterization of Markov equilibria. Our analysis proceeds by construction and isolates the importance of a local disagreement index, `beta(c)`, defined as the ratio of marginal utility for those in and out of power. If disagreement is constant the model specializes to hyperbolic discounting. We also provide novel results for this case, offering a complete and simple characterization of equilibria. For the general model we shoe that dissaving occurs when disagreements are sufficiently high, while saving occurs when disagreements are sufficiently low. When disagreements vary sufficiently with spending, richer dynamics are possible. We provide conditions for continuous equilibria and also show that the model can be inverted for primitives that support any smooth consumption function. Our framework applies to individuals under a behavioral interpretation or to governments under a political-economy interpretation.
主题	Microeconomics ; Mathematical Tools ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Behavioral Economics ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Poverty and Wellbeing ; Development and Growth ; Development
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w22007
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579681
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Dan Cao,Iván Werning. Dynamic Savings Choices with Disagreements. 2016.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w22007.pdf（1032KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览