| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22034 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22034 |
| Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency and Borrower Runs: Loan Repayment Delays in Italy | |
| Fabio Schiantarelli; Massimiliano Stacchini; Philip E. Strahan | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-29 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Exposure to liquidity risk makes banks vulnerable to runs from both depositors and from wholesale, short-term investors. This paper shows empirically that banks are also vulnerable to run-like behavior from borrowers who delay their loan repayments (default). Firms in Italy defaulted more against banks with high levels of past losses. We control for borrower fundamentals with firm-quarter fixed effects; thus, identification comes from a firm's choice to default against one bank versus another, depending upon their health. This `selective' default increases where legal enforcement is weak. Poor enforcement thus can create a systematic loan risk by encouraging borrowers to default en masse once the continuation value of their bank relationships comes into doubt. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22034 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579707 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabio Schiantarelli,Massimiliano Stacchini,Philip E. Strahan. Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency and Borrower Runs: Loan Repayment Delays in Italy. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22034.pdf（606KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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