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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22038
来源IDWorking Paper 22038
Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search
Dominic Coey; Bradley Larsen; Brennan Platt
发表日期2016-02-29
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex-ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase a good reveal consumers' reservation prices. We find robust evidence supporting the theory, and demonstrate that ignoring buyer deadlines can distort estimates of market welfare, consumer demand, and underlying causes of market shifts.
主题Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22038
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579711
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GB/T 7714
Dominic Coey,Bradley Larsen,Brennan Platt. Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search. 2016.
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