| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22039 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22039 |
| Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining | |
| Matthew Grennan; Ashley Swanson | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-29 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using a detailed dataset of hospitals' purchase orders, we find that information on purchasing by peer hospitals leads to reductions in the prices hospitals negotiate for supplies. Identification is based on staggered access to information across hospitals over time. Within coronary stents, reductions are concentrated among hospitals previously paying relatively high prices and for brands purchased in large volumes, and are consistent with resolving asymmetric information problems. Estimates across a large number of other important product categories indicate that the effects of information are largest in both absolute and relative terms for physician preference items (PPIs). Among PPIs, high-price, high-quantity hospital-brand combinations average 3.9 percent savings, versus 1.6 percent for commodities. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22039 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579712 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Grennan,Ashley Swanson. Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22039.pdf（974KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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