| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22050 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22050 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct | |
| Mark Egan; Gregor Matvos; Amit Seru | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-29 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct a novel database containing the universe of financial advisers in the United States from 2005 to 2015, representing approximately 10% of employment of the finance and insurance sector. We provide the first large-scale study that documents the economy-wide extent of misconduct among financial advisers and the associated labor market consequences of misconduct. Seven percent of advisers have misconduct records, and this share reaches more than 15% at some of the largest advisory firms. Roughly one third of advisers with misconduct are repeat offenders. Prior offenders are five times as likely to engage in new misconduct as the average financial adviser. Firms discipline misconduct: approximately half of financial advisers lose their jobs after misconduct. The labor market partially undoes firm-level discipline by rehiring such advisers. Firms that hire these advisers also have higher rates of prior misconduct themselves, suggesting “matching on misconduct.” These firms are less desirable and offer lower compensation. We argue that heterogeneity in consumer sophistication could explain the prevalence and persistence of misconduct at such firms. Misconduct is concentrated at firms with retail customers and in counties with low education, elderly populations, and high incomes. Our findings are consistent with some firms “specializing” in misconduct and catering to unsophisticated consumers, while others use their clean reputation to attract sophisticated consumers. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22050 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579723 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Egan,Gregor Matvos,Amit Seru. The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22050.pdf（813KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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