| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22056 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22056 |
| A Market Based Solution for Fire Sales and Other Pecuniary Externalities | |
| Weerachart T. Kilenthong; Robert M. Townsend | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-07 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show how bundling, exclusivity and additional markets internalize fire sale and other pecuniary externalities. Ex ante competition can achieve a constrained efficient allocation. The solution can be put rather simply: create segregated market exchanges which specify prices in advance and price the right to trade in these markets so that participant types pay, or are compensated, consistent with the market exchange they choose and that type's excess demand contribution to the price in that exchange. We do not need to identify and quantify some policy intervention. With the appropriate ex ante design we can let markets solve the problem. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22056 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579729 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Weerachart T. Kilenthong,Robert M. Townsend. A Market Based Solution for Fire Sales and Other Pecuniary Externalities. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22056.pdf（645KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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