| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22087 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22087 |
| The Design of Trade Agreements | |
| Kyle Bagwell; Robert W. Staiger | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-21 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What does economics have to say about the design of international trade agreements? We review a literature on this question, providing detailed coverage on three key design features of the GATT/WTO: reciprocity, nondiscrimination as embodied in the MFN principle, and tariff bindings and binding "overhang." Each of these features is central to the design of the GATT/WTO, and we argue that an economic perspective can go a long way toward revealing a consistent logic to the inclusion of these design features in trade agreements. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22087 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579761 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kyle Bagwell,Robert W. Staiger. The Design of Trade Agreements. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22087.pdf（989KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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