| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22156 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22156 |
| Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile | |
| W. Bentley MacLeod; Teck Yong Tan | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-04-11 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied. An authority contract has the Principal reveal his information before the Agent responds with her information. Under such a contract, the Agent's compensation varies only with the Principal's information, while her information is used to punish untruthful behavior by the Principal. Conversely, a sales contract has the Agent reveal her information first. In this case, the Agent's performance incentives are affected by the information revealed by both parties. Because the Agent's information affects her compensation, the information revelation constraints are more complex under a sales contract, and provide a way to integrate Williamson's (1975) notion of guile into agency theory. We find that designing sales contracts for expert agents, such as physicians and financial advisors, are significantly more complex than designing optimal authority contracts. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22156 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579830 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | W. Bentley MacLeod,Teck Yong Tan. Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22156.pdf（856KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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