| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22165 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22165 |
| The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations | |
| Thomas S. Dee; Will Dobbie; Brian A. Jacob; Jonah Rockoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-04-11 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we show that the design and decentralized, school-based scoring of New York’s high school exit exams – the Regents Examinations – led to the systematic manipulation of test sores just below important proficiency cutoffs. Our estimates suggest that teachers inflate approximately 40 percent of test scores near the proficiency cutoffs. Teachers are more likely to inflate the scores of high-achieving students on the margin, but low-achieving students benefit more from manipulation in aggregate due to the greater density of these students near the proficiency cutoffs. Exploiting a series of reforms that eliminated score manipulation, we find that inflating a student’s score to fall just above a cutoff increases his or her probability of graduating from high school by 27 percent. These results have important implications for educational attainment of marginal high school graduates. For example, we estimate that the black-white graduation gap is about 5 percent larger in the absence of test score manipulation. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22165 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579839 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas S. Dee,Will Dobbie,Brian A. Jacob,et al. The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22165.pdf（1004KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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