| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22197 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22197 |
| How a Minimum Carbon Price Commitment Might Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality | |
| Martin L. Weitzman | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-02 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is difficult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by negotiating many different quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single internationally-binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) counters self-interest by incentivizing countries to internalize the externality. In this contribution I attempt to sketch out, mostly with verbal arguments, the sense in which each country's extra cost from a higher emissions price is counter-balanced by that country's extra benefit from inducing all other countries to simultaneously lower their emissions in response to the higher price. Some implications are discussed. While the paper could be centered on a more formal model, here the tone of the discussion resembles more that of an exploratory think piece directed to policymakers and the general public. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22197 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579871 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin L. Weitzman. How a Minimum Carbon Price Commitment Might Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22197.pdf（179KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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