| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22201 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22201 |
| The Economics of Bank Supervision | |
| Thomas M. Eisenbach; David O. Lucca; Robert M. Townsend | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-02 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model distinguishing supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relation between supervisory efforts and bank characteristics observed in the data. More supervisory resources are spent on larger, more complex, and riskier banks. However, hours increase less than proportionally with bank size, suggesting the presence of technological scale economies in supervision. The data also show reallocation of supervisory hours at times of stress and in the post-2008 enhanced supervisory framework for large banks, providing evidence of constraints on supervisory resources. Finally, we show theoretically limits to assessing supervisory success based on ex-post outcomes, as well as benefits of ex-ante commitment policies. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22201 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579875 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas M. Eisenbach,David O. Lucca,Robert M. Townsend. The Economics of Bank Supervision. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22201.pdf（513KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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