| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22219 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22219 |
| Communication in Vertical Markets: Experimental Evidence | |
| Claudia Möllers; Hans-Theo Normann; Christopher M. Snyder | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-09 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstream firms, it may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the upstream firm to chat privately with each downstream firm reduces total offered quantity from near the Cournot level (observed in the absence of communication) halfway toward the monopoly level. Allowing all three firms to chat together openly results in complete monopolization. Downstream firms obtain such a bargaining advantage from open communication that all of the gains from monopolizing the market accrue to them. A simple structural model of Nash bargaining fits the pattern of shifting surpluses well. We conclude with a discussion of the antitrust implications of open communication in vertical markets. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22219 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579893 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Claudia Möllers,Hans-Theo Normann,Christopher M. Snyder. Communication in Vertical Markets: Experimental Evidence. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22219.pdf（341KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
