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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w22221 |
来源ID | Working Paper 22221 |
Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria | |
Mitchell Hoffman; Gianmarco León; María Lombardi | |
发表日期 | 2016-05-09 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study a unique quasi-experiment in Austria, where compulsory voting laws are changed across Austria's nine states at different times. Analyzing state and national elections from 1949-2010, we show that compulsory voting laws with weakly enforced fines increase turnout by roughly 10 percentage points. However, we find no evidence that this change in turnout affected government spending patterns (in levels or composition) or electoral outcomes. Individual-level data on turnout and political preferences suggest these results occur because individuals swayed to vote due to compulsory voting are more likely to be non-partisan, have low interest in politics, and be uninformed. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Other ; Economic Systems |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22221 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579895 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mitchell Hoffman,Gianmarco León,María Lombardi. Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria. 2016. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w22221.pdf(558KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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