| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22231 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22231 |
| Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants | |
| Alessandra Casella; Jean Francois Laslier; Antonin Macé | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-09 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In polarized committees, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. Allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues restores some minority power. However, it also creates a complex strategic scenario: a hide-and-seek game between majority and minority voters that corresponds to a decentralized version of the Colonel Blotto game. We offer theoretical results and bring the game to the laboratory. The minority wins as frequently as theory predicts, despite subjects deviating from equilibrium strategies. Because subjects understand the logic of the game — minority voters must concentrate votes unpredictably — the exact choices are of secondary importance, a result that vouches for the robustness of the voting rule to strategic mistakes. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22231 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579905 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Jean Francois Laslier,Antonin Macé. Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22231.pdf（816KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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