| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22240 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22240 |
| Collective Action in an Asymmetric World | |
| Cuicui Chen; Richard J. Zeckhauser | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-16 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly challenging because of the strong asymmetries among nations. We identify a solution, the Cheap-Riding Efficient Equilibrium, that defines the relative contributions of players in differing size (or preference intensity) to reflect cheap riding incentives, yet still achieves Pareto optimality. Players start by establishing the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium as a base point. From that point they apply either the principles of the Nash Bargaining Solution or the Lindahl Equilibrium to proceed to the Pareto frontier. We apply our theory to climate change mitigation, a critical international public good. Having examined the Nordhaus Climate Club proposal, we test the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium model using individual nations' Intended Nationally Determined Contributions pledged at the Paris Climate Change Conference. As hypothesized, larger nations made much larger pledges in proportion to their Gross National Incomes. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; International Economics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22240 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579914 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Cuicui Chen,Richard J. Zeckhauser. Collective Action in an Asymmetric World. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22240.pdf（404KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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