| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22250 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22250 |
| The Political Agenda Effect and State Centralization | |
| Daron Acemoglu; James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide a potential explanation for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state based on the political agenda effect. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their demands in the direction of more general-interest public goods, and away from parochial transfers. This political agenda effect raises the effectiveness of citizen demands and induces them to increase their investments in conflict capacity. In the absence of state centralization, citizens do not necessarily band together because of another force, the escalation effect, which refers to the fact that elites from different regions will join forces in response to the citizens doing so. Such escalation might hurt the citizen groups that have already solved their collective action problem (though it will benefit others). Anticipating the interplay of the political agenda and escalation effects, under some parameter configurations, political elites strategically opt for a non-centralized state. We show how the model generates non-monotonic comparative statics in response to the increase in the value or effectiveness of public goods (so that centralized states and public good provision are absent precisely when they are more beneficial for society). We also suggest how the formation of a social democratic party may sometimes induce state centralization (by removing the commitment value of a non-centralized state), and how elites may sometimes prefer partial state centralization. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22250 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579928 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoglu,James A. Robinson,Ragnar Torvik. The Political Agenda Effect and State Centralization. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22250.pdf（406KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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