| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22297 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22297 |
| Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination | |
| George-Marios Angeletos; Chen Lian | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-06 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This chapter studies how incomplete information helps accommodate frictions in coordination, leading to novel insights on the joint determination of expectations and macroeconomic outcomes. We review and synthesize recent work on global games, beauty contests, and their applications. We elaborate on the distinct effects of strategic uncertainty relative to fundamental uncertainty. We demonstrate the potential fragility of workhorse macroeconomic models to relaxations of common knowledge; the possibility of operationalizing the notions of “coordination failure” and “animal spirits” in a manner that unifies unique- and multiple-equilibrium models; and the ability of incomplete information to offer a parsimonious explanation of important empirical regularities. We provide a general treatment of these ideas, as well as specific applications in the context of business cycles, financial crises, and asset pricing. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22297 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579970 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | George-Marios Angeletos,Chen Lian. Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22297.pdf（1817KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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