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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w22305 |
来源ID | Working Paper 22305 |
The Upside-down Economics of Regulated and Otherwise Rigid Prices | |
Casey B. Mulligan; Kevin K. Tsui | |
发表日期 | 2016-06-06 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | A hedonic model featuring quality-quantity tradeoffs reveals a number of surprising market behaviors that can result from price regulations that are imposed on competitive markets for products that have adjustable non-price attributes. Quality need not clear a competitive market in the same way that prices do, because quality can reduce the willingness to pay for quantity. Producers can benefit from price ceilings, at the expense of consumers. Price ceilings can result in quality-degradation “death spirals” that would not occur under quality regulation or excise taxation. The features of tastes and technology that lead to such outcomes are summarized with pairwise comparisons of (not necessarily constant) elasticities. |
主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Regulatory Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22305 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579978 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Casey B. Mulligan,Kevin K. Tsui. The Upside-down Economics of Regulated and Otherwise Rigid Prices. 2016. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w22305.pdf(831KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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