| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22321 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22321 |
| The Political Economy of Underfunded Municipal Pension Plans | |
| Jeffrey Brinkman; Daniele Coen-Pirani; Holger Sieg | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the determinants of underfunding of local government's pension funds using a politico-economic overlapping generations model. We show that a binding downpayment constraint in the housing market dampens capitalization of future taxes into current land prices. Thus, a local government's pension funding policy matters for land prices and the utility of young households. Underfunding arises in equilibrium if the pension funding policy is set by the old generation. Young households instead favor a policy of full funding. Empirical results based on cross-city comparisons in the magnitude of unfunded liabilities are consistent with the predictions of the model. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Regional and Urban Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22321 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579994 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeffrey Brinkman,Daniele Coen-Pirani,Holger Sieg. The Political Economy of Underfunded Municipal Pension Plans. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22321.pdf（363KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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