| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22330 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22330 |
| Information Spillovers in Sovereign Debt Markets | |
| Harold Cole; Daniel Neuhann; Guillermo Ordoñez | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of information spillovers in primary sovereign bond markets where governments raise funds from a common pool of competitive investors who may acquire information about default risk and later trade in secondary markets. Strategic complementarities in information acquisition lead to the co-existence of an informed regime with high yields and high volatility, and a Pareto-dominant uninformed regime with low yields and low volatility. Small shocks to default risk in a single country may trigger information acquisition, retrenchment of capital flows, and sharp yield increases within and across countries. Competitive secondary markets strengthen information acquisition incentives, raise primary market yields, and amplify spillovers. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22330 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580003 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harold Cole,Daniel Neuhann,Guillermo Ordoñez. Information Spillovers in Sovereign Debt Markets. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22330.pdf（683KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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