| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22340 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22340 |
| The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan | |
| Michael Callen; Saad Gulzar; Syed Ali Hasanain; Muhammad Yasir Khan | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Public sector absenteeism undermines service delivery in many developing countries. We report results from an at-scale randomized control evaluation in Punjab, Pakistan of a reform designed to address this problem. The reform affects healthcare for 100 million citizens across 297 political constituencies. It equips government inspectors with a smartphone monitoring system and leads to a 76% increase in inspections. However, the surge in inspections does not always translate into increased doctor attendance. The scale of the experiment permits an investigation into the mechanisms underlying this result. We find that experimentally increasing the salience of doctor absence when communicating inspection reports to senior policymakers improves subsequent doctor attendance. Next, we find that both the reform and the communication of information to senior officials are more impactful in politically competitive constituencies. Our results suggest that interactions between politicians and bureaucrats might play a critical role in shaping the success or failure of reforms. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22340 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580013 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Callen,Saad Gulzar,Syed Ali Hasanain,et al. The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22340.pdf（3939KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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