| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22342 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22342 |
| The Effects of Wage Contracts on Workplace Misbehaviors: Evidence from a Call Center Natural Field Experiment | |
| Jeffrey A. Flory; Andreas Leibbrandt; John A. List | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Workplace misbehaviors are often governed by explicit monitoring and strict punishment. Such enforcement activities can serve to lessen worker productivity and harm worker morale. We take a different approach to curbing worker misbehavior—bonuses. Examining more than 6500 donor phone calls across more than 80 workers, we use a natural field experiment to investigate how different wage contracts influence workers’ propensity to cheat and sabotage one another. Our findings show that even though standard relative performance pay contracts, relative to a fixed wage scheme, increase productivity, they have a dark side: they cause considerable cheating and sabotage of co-workers. Yet, even in such environments, by including an unexpected bonus, the employer can substantially curb worker misbehavior. In this manner, our findings reveal how employers can effectively leverage bonuses to eliminate undesired behaviors induced by performance pay contracts. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22342 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580015 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeffrey A. Flory,Andreas Leibbrandt,John A. List. The Effects of Wage Contracts on Workplace Misbehaviors: Evidence from a Call Center Natural Field Experiment. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22342.pdf（1110KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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