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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w22359 |
来源ID | Working Paper 22359 |
Optimal Automatic Stabilizers | |
Alisdair McKay; Ricardo Reis | |
发表日期 | 2016-06-20 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Should the generosity of unemployment benefits and the progressivity of income taxes depend on the presence of business cycles? This paper proposes a tractable model where there is a role for social insurance against uninsurable shocks to income and unemployment, as well as inefficient business cycles driven by aggregate shocks through matching frictions and nominal rigidities. We derive an augmented Baily-Chetty formula showing that the optimal generosity and progressivity depend on a macroeconomic stabilization term. Using a series of analytical examples, we show that this term typically pushes for an increase in generosity and progressivity as long as slack is more responsive to social programs in recessions. A calibration to the U.S. economy shows that taking concerns for macroeconomic stabilization into account raises the optimal unemployment benefits replacement rate by 13 percentage points but has a negligible impact on the optimal progressivity of the income tax. More generally, the role of social insurance programs as automatic stabilizers affects their optimal design. |
主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22359 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580033 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alisdair McKay,Ricardo Reis. Optimal Automatic Stabilizers. 2016. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w22359.pdf(616KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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