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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22387
来源IDWorking Paper 22387
A Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Experienced Workers
Kevin Lang; Russell Weinstein
发表日期2016-07-11
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We show that in labor market models with adverse selection, otherwise observationally equivalent workers will experience less wage growth following a period in which they change jobs than following a period in which they do not. We find little or no evidence to support this prediction. In most specifications the coefficient has the opposite sign, sometimes statistically significantly so. When consistent with the prediction, the estimated effects are small and statistically insignificant. We consistently reject large effects in the predicted direction. We argue informally that our results are also problematic for a broader class of models of competitive labor markets.
主题Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22387
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580060
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GB/T 7714
Kevin Lang,Russell Weinstein. A Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Experienced Workers. 2016.
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