| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22406 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22406 |
| The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study | |
| Marco Battaglini; Salvatore Nunnari; Thomas R. Palfrey | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-18 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to study political distortions in the accumulation of public debt. A legislature bargains over the levels of a public good and of district specific transfers in two periods. The legislature can issue or purchase risk-free bonds in the first period and the level of public debt creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that public policies are inefficient and efficiency is increasing in the size of the majority requirement, with higher investment in public goods and lower debt associated with larger majority requirements. Also in line with the theory, we find that debt is lower when the probability of a negative shock to the economy in the second period is higher, evidence that debt is used to smooth consumption. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Public Economics ; Public Goods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22406 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580080 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Battaglini,Salvatore Nunnari,Thomas R. Palfrey. The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22406.pdf（607KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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