| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22443 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22443 |
| Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians | |
| Eric Avis; Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-25 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Political corruption is considered a major impediment to economic development, and yet it remains pervasive throughout the world. This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil’s anti-corruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate. Based on our estimated model, the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived threat of the non-electoral costs of engaging in corruption. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Innovation and R& ; D ; Growth and Productivity ; Country Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22443 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580117 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric Avis,Claudio Ferraz,Frederico Finan. Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22443.pdf（424KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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