| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22477 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22477 |
| Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? | |
| Darren J. Kisgen; Matthew Osborn; Jonathan Reuter | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine whether credit rating agencies reward accurate or biased analysts. Using data collected from Moody’s corporate debt credit reports, we find that Moody’s is more likely to promote analysts who are accurate, but less likely to promote analysts who downgrade frequently. Combined, analysts who are accurate but not overly negative are approximately twice as likely to get promoted. Further, analysts whose rating changes are more informative to the market are more likely to get promoted, unless their ratings changes cause large negative market reactions. Moody’s balances a desire for accuracy with a desire to cater to its corporate clients. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22477 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580152 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Darren J. Kisgen,Matthew Osborn,Jonathan Reuter. Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias?. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22477.pdf（1539KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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