| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22486 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22486 |
| Peer Information and Risk-taking under Competitive and Non-competitive Pay Schemes | |
| Philip Brookins; Jennifer Brown; Dmitry Ryvkin | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Incentive schemes that reward participants based on their relative performance are often thought to be particularly risk-inducing. Using a novel, real-effort task experiment in the laboratory, we find that the relationship between incentives and risk-taking is more nuanced and depends critically on the availability of information about peers’ strategies and outcomes. Indeed, we find that when no peer information is available, relative rewards schemes are associated with significantly less risk-taking than non-competitive rewards. In contrast, when decision-makers receive information about their peers’ actions and/or outcomes, relative incentive schemes are associated with more risk-taking than non-competitive schemes. The nature of the feedback—whether subjects receive information about peers’ strategies, outcomes, or both—also affects risk-taking. We find no evidence that competitors imitate their peers when they face only feedback about other subjects’ risk-taking strategies. However, decision-makers take more risk when they see the gaps between their performance score and their peers’ scores grow. Combined feedback about peers’ strategies and performance—from which subjects may assess the overall relationship between risk-taking and success—is associated with more risk-taking when rewards are based on relative performance; we find no similar effect for non-competitive rewards. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22486 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580160 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philip Brookins,Jennifer Brown,Dmitry Ryvkin. Peer Information and Risk-taking under Competitive and Non-competitive Pay Schemes. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22486.pdf（373KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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