| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22493 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22493 |
| Do Private Equity Funds Manipulate Reported Returns? | |
| Gregory W. Brown; Oleg R. Gredil; Steven N. Kaplan | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Private equity funds hold assets that are hard to value. Managers may have an incentive to distort reported valuations if these are used by investors to decide on commitments to subsequent funds managed by the same firm. Using a large dataset of buyout and venture funds, we test for the presence of reported return manipulation. We find evidence that some under-performing managers boost reported returns during times when fundraising takes place. However, those managers are unlikely to raise a next fund, suggesting that investors see through much of the manipulation. In contrast, we find that top-performing funds likely understate their valuations. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22493 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580167 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gregory W. Brown,Oleg R. Gredil,Steven N. Kaplan. Do Private Equity Funds Manipulate Reported Returns?. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22493.pdf（575KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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