| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22509 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22509 |
| Optimal Domestic (and External) Sovereign Default | |
| Pablo D'; Erasmo; Enrique G. Mendoza | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-15 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Infrequent but turbulent episodes of outright sovereign default on domestic creditors are considered a “forgotten history” in Macroeconomics. We propose a heterogeneous-agents model in which optimal debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors are driven by distributional incentives and endogenous default costs due to the value of debt for self-insurance, liquidity and risk-sharing. The government's aim to redistribute resources across agents and through time in response to uninsurable shocks produces a rich dynamic feedback mechanism linking debt issuance, the distribution of government bond holdings, the default decision, and risk premia. Calibrated to Spanish data, the model is consistent with key cyclical co-movements and features of debt-crisis dynamics. Debt exhibits protracted fluctuations. Defaults have a low frequency of 0.93 percent, are preceded by surging debt and spreads, and occur with relatively low external debt. Default risk limits the sustainable debt and yet spreads are zero most of the time. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Financial Economics ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22509 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580182 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pablo D',Erasmo,Enrique G. Mendoza. Optimal Domestic (and External) Sovereign Default. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22509.pdf（604KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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