| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22570 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22570 |
| The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements | |
| Laurent Bouton; Alessandro Lizzeri; Nicola Persico | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-25 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a dynamic political-economic model of total government obligations. Its focus is on the interplay between debt and entitlements. In our model, both are tools by which temporarily powerful groups can extract resources from groups that will be powerful in the future: debt transfers resources across periods; entitlements directly target the future allocation of resources. We prove the following results. First, the presence of endogenous entitlements dampens the incentives of politically powerful groups to accumulate debt, but it leads to an increase in total government obligations. Second, fiscal rules can have perverse effects: if entitlements are unconstrained, and there are capital market frictions, debt limits lead to an increase in total government obligations and to worse outcomes for all groups. Analogous results hold for entitlement limits. Third, our model sheds some lights on the influence of capital market frictions on the incentives of governments to adopt fiscal rules, and implement entitlement programs. Finally, we identify preference polarization as a possible explanation for the joint growth of debt and entitlements. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22570 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580244 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton,Alessandro Lizzeri,Nicola Persico. The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22570.pdf（641KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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