| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22584 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22584 |
| Buying Reputation as a Signal of Quality: Evidence from an Online Marketplace | |
| Lingfang (Ivy) Li; Steven Tadelis; Xiaolan Zhou | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Reputation is critical to foster trust in online marketplaces, yet leaving feedback is a public good that can be under-provided unless buyers are rewarded for it. Signaling theory implies that only high quality sellers would reward buyers for truthful feedback. We explore this scope for signaling using Taobao's "reward-for-feedback" mechanism and find that items with rewards generate sales that are nearly 30% higher and are sold by higher quality sellers. The market design implication is that marketplaces can benefit from allowing sellers to use rewards to build reputations and signal their high quality in the process. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22584 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580258 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lingfang ,Steven Tadelis,Xiaolan Zhou. Buying Reputation as a Signal of Quality: Evidence from an Online Marketplace. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22584.pdf（625KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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