| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22594 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22594 |
| Financial Safety Nets | |
| Julien Bengui; Javier Bianchi; Louphou Coulibaly | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we study the optimal design of financial safety nets under limited private credit. We ask when it is optimal to restrict ex ante the set of investors that can receive public liquidity support ex post. When the government can commit, the optimal safety net covers all investors. Introducing a wedge between identical investors is inefficient. Without commitment, an optimally designed financial safety net covers only a subset of investors. Compared to an economy where all investors are protected, this results in more liquid portfolios, better social insurance, and higher ex ante welfare. Our result can rationalize the prevalent limited coverage of safety nets, such as the lender of last resort facilities. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22594 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580268 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Julien Bengui,Javier Bianchi,Louphou Coulibaly. Financial Safety Nets. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22594.pdf（652KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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