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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22594
来源IDWorking Paper 22594
Financial Safety Nets
Julien Bengui; Javier Bianchi; Louphou Coulibaly
发表日期2016-09-01
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要In this paper, we study the optimal design of financial safety nets under limited private credit. We ask when it is optimal to restrict ex ante the set of investors that can receive public liquidity support ex post. When the government can commit, the optimal safety net covers all investors. Introducing a wedge between identical investors is inefficient. Without commitment, an optimally designed financial safety net covers only a subset of investors. Compared to an economy where all investors are protected, this results in more liquid portfolios, better social insurance, and higher ex ante welfare. Our result can rationalize the prevalent limited coverage of safety nets, such as the lender of last resort facilities.
主题Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22594
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580268
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GB/T 7714
Julien Bengui,Javier Bianchi,Louphou Coulibaly. Financial Safety Nets. 2016.
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