| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22598 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22598 |
| Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals | |
| Paul J. Eliason; Paul L. E. Grieco; Ryan C. McDevitt; James W. Roberts | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Medicare's prospective payment system for long-term acute-care hospitals (LTCHs) pro- vides modest reimbursements at the beginning of a patient's stay before jumping discontinuously to a large lump-sum payment after a pre-specified number of days. We show that LTCHs respond to financial incentives by disproportionately discharging patients after they cross the large-payment threshold, resulting in worse outcomes for patients. We find this occurs more often at for-profit facilities, facilities acquired by leading LTCH chains, and facilities co-located with other hospitals. Using a dynamic structural model, we evaluate counterfactual payment policies that would provide substantial savings for Medicare without adversely affecting patients. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22598 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580272 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul J. Eliason,Paul L. E. Grieco,Ryan C. McDevitt,et al. Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22598.pdf（564KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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