| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22617 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22617 |
| The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives | |
| Daron Acemoglu; Leopoldo Fergusson; James A. Robinson; Dario Romero; Juan F. Vargas | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-12 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | High-powered incentives for the military and security services have become a common counterinsurgency strategy over the last several decades. We investigate the use of such incentives for members of the Colombian army in the long-running civil war against left-wing guerillas, and show that it produced several perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as ‘false positives’). Exploiting the fact that Colombian colonels have stronger career concerns and should be more responsive to such incentives, we show that there were significantly more false positives during the period of high-powered incentives in municipalities where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels and in those where checks coming from civilian judicial institutions were weaker. We further find that in municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the period of high-powered incentives coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in the overall security situation. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22617 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580290 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoglu,Leopoldo Fergusson,James A. Robinson,et al. The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22617.pdf（1041KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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