| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22634 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22634 |
| Incentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment | |
| Assaf Hamdani; Eugene Kandel; Yevgeny Mugerman; Yishay Yafeh | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-19 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Concerned with excessive risk taking, regulators worldwide generally prohibit private pension funds from charging performance-based fees. Instead, the premise underlying the regulation of private pension schemes (and other retail-oriented funds) is that competition among fund managers should provide them with the adequate incentives to make investment decisions that would serve their clients’ long-term interests. Using a regulatory experiment from Israel, we compare the effects of incentive fees and competition on the performance of three exogenously-given types of long-term savings schemes operated by the same management companies: (i) funds with performance-based fees, facing no competition; (ii) funds with AUM-based fees, facing low competitive pressure; and (iii) funds with AUM-based fees, operating in a highly competitive environment. Our main result is that funds with performance-based fees exhibit significantly higher risk-adjusted returns than other funds, but are not necessarily riskier (that depends on the measure of risk used). By contrast, we find that competitive pressure leads to poor performance, and conclude that incentives and competition are not perfect substitutes in the retirement savings industry. Our analysis suggests that the pervasive regulatory restrictions on the use of performance-based fees in pension fund management may be costly for savers in the long-run. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22634 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580308 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Assaf Hamdani,Eugene Kandel,Yevgeny Mugerman,et al. Incentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22634.pdf（462KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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