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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22651
来源IDWorking Paper 22651
Capital Share Dynamics When Firms Insure Workers
Barney Hartman-Glaser; Hanno Lustig; Mindy Z. Xiaolan
发表日期2016-09-19
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要Although the aggregate capital share of U.S. firms has increased, the firm-level capital share of a typical U.S. firm has decreased. This divergence is due to mega-firms that now produce a larger output share without a proportionate increase in labor compensation. We develop a model in which firms insure workers against firm-specific shocks, where more productive firms allocate more rents to shareholders, while less productive firms endogenously exit. Increasing firm-level risk delays exit and increases the measure of mega-firms, which raises the aggregate capital share while lowering the average firm's capital share. An increase in the level of rents quantitatively magnifies this effect. We present evidence supporting this mechanism.
主题Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22651
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580324
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Barney Hartman-Glaser,Hanno Lustig,Mindy Z. Xiaolan. Capital Share Dynamics When Firms Insure Workers. 2016.
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