| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22692 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22692 |
| Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance, Risk-Taking and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th Century Banks | |
| Charles W. Calomiris; Matthew S. Jaremski | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-03 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Deposit insurance reduces liquidity risk but it also can increase insolvency risk by encouraging reckless behavior. A handful of U.S. states installed deposit insurance laws before the creation of the FDIC in 1933, and those laws only applied to some depository institutions within those states. These experiments present a unique testing ground for investigating the effect of deposit insurance. We show that deposit insurance increased risk by removing market discipline that had been constraining erstwhile uninsured banks. Taking advantages of the rising world agricultural prices during World War I, insured banks increased their insolvency risk, and competed aggressively for the deposits of uninsured banks operating nearby. When prices fell after the War, the insured systems collapsed and suffered especially high losses. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; History ; Financial History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22692 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580365 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles W. Calomiris,Matthew S. Jaremski. Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance, Risk-Taking and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th Century Banks. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22692.pdf（778KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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