| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22701 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22701 |
| Securing Property Rights | |
| A. Patrick Behrer; Edward L. Glaeser; Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto; Andrei Shleifer | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-03 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong—the state or its powerful citizens—against the weak. We present evidence that undue influence on courts is a common concern in many countries, especially among the poor. We then present a model of a water polluter whose discharges contaminate riparian properties belonging to multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation from the efficiency viewpoint. When the polluter can subvert the assessment of damages, property rules are preferred to liability rules when there are few parties and bargaining is feasible, but they excessively deter efficient pollution when bargaining between many parties fails. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. Our model helps explain the evolution of the legal treatment of water pollution from property rules to liability rules to regulation. An empirical analysis of water quality in the U.S. before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22701 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580374 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Patrick Behrer,Edward L. Glaeser,Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto,et al. Securing Property Rights. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22701.pdf（1773KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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