| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w22703
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22703
|
| Reputation Cycles |
| Boyan Jovanovic; Julien Prat
|
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-03
|
| 出版年 | 2016
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper shows that endogenous cycles can arise when contracts between firms and their customers are incomplete and when products are experience goods. Then firms invest in the quality of their output in order to establish a good reputation. Cycles arise because investment in reputation causes self-fulfilling changes in the discount factor. Cycles are more likely to occur when information diffuses slowly and consumers exhibit high risk aversion. A rise in idiosyncratic uncertainty is of two kinds that work in opposite ways: Noise in observing effort is contractionary as it generally is in agency models. But a rise in the variance of the distribution of abilities is expansionary. A calibrated version produces realistic fluctuations in terms of peak-to-trough movements in consumption and the spacing of time between recessions. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Business Cycles
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22703
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580376
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Boyan Jovanovic,Julien Prat. Reputation Cycles. 2016.
|
|
文件名：
|
w22703.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
