G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22705
来源IDWorking Paper 22705
The Politics of FDI Expropriation
Marina Azzimonti
发表日期2016-10-03
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要I examine the role of political instability as a potential explanation for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e. the `Lucas Paradox'). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document the following: (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk are those that typically receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) investment risk is generally higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the investment risk channel. I then inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political-economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers have access to an expropriation technology that can be used to extract resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group-specific transfers to domestic workers, but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. Different social groups compete to gain control of this instrument, but face a probability of losing power at each point in time. The greater the degree of political turnover is, the stronger the incentives to expropriate when in power. A key force driving this result is redistributive uncertainty, since there is a possibility that no transfers will be received in the future. The mechanism is supported by the finding that investment risk (a measure that captures the degree to which the extraction technology is used) is negatively related to FDI and government stability. Finally, I show that the political equilibrium exhibits over-expropriation and under-investment even when there is no political uncertainty because fractionalized societies suffer from static inefficiencies due to the presence of a common pool problem.
主题Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics ; Taxation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22705
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580378
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marina Azzimonti. The Politics of FDI Expropriation. 2016.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w22705.pdf(558KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Marina Azzimonti]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Marina Azzimonti]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Marina Azzimonti]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w22705.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。