| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22710 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22710 |
| Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling | |
| Benjamin B. Bederson; Ginger Zhe Jin; Phillip Leslie; Alexander J. Quinn; Ben Zou | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-10 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In 2011, Maricopa County adopted voluntary restaurant hygiene grade cards (A, B, C, D). Using inspections results between 2007 and 2013, we show that only 58 percent of the subsequent inspections led to online grade posting. Although the disclosure rate in general declines with inspection outcome, higher-quality A restaurants are less likely to disclose than lower-quality As. After examining potential explanations, we believe the observed pattern is best explained by a mixture of signaling and countersignaling: the better A restaurants use nondisclosure as a countersignal, while worse As and better Bs use disclosure to stand out from the other restaurants. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22710 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580384 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin B. Bederson,Ginger Zhe Jin,Phillip Leslie,et al. Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22710.pdf（424KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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