全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Bidding Dynamics in Auctions

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w22716
来源ID	Working Paper 22716
	Bidding Dynamics in Auctions
	Hugo Hopenhayn; Maryam Saeedi
发表日期	2016-10-10
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies bidding dynamics where values and bidding opportunities follow an unrestricted joint Markov process, independent across agents. Bids cannot be retracted, as is frequently the case in auctions. Our main methodological contribution is that we construct a mapping from this general stochastic process into a distribution of values that is independent of the type of auction considered. The equilibria of a static auction with this distribution of values is used to characterize the equilibria of the dynamic auction, making this general class very tractable. As a result of the option of future rebidding, early bids are shaded and under mild conditions increase toward the end of the auction. Our results are consistent with repeated bidding and skewness of the time distribution of winning bids, two puzzling observations in dynamic auctions. As an application, we estimate the model by matching moments from eBay auctions.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w22716
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580389
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Hugo Hopenhayn,Maryam Saeedi. Bidding Dynamics in Auctions. 2016.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w22716.pdf（809KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览